Hamlet, Free will, Compatibilism, and some Musings
In Act 5 Scene 2 of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a very interesting point about freewill is made when Hamlet responds to Horatio’s suggestion to avoid dueling Laertes. Responding to Horatio, Hamlet says,
“Not a whit. We defy augury. There is a
Special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be
now, ‘tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be
now; if it be not now, yet it will come. The
readiness is all. Since no man of aught he leaves
knows, what is ‘t to leave betimes? Let be.
In the above excerpt, Hamlet seems to accept our inability to control fate (I take this to be applicable to determinism, either secular or non-secular, though Shakespeare refers to fate determined by God). As Evan Robertson notes, “augury” refers to superstition or divination: human attempts to understand fate. When Hamlet writes “We defy augury,” he suggests that in our actual lived experiences “We” ultimately end up “defying” what we as humans try to predict for ourselves. Hamlet suggests it is folly to attempt to change our fate based on our prediction or “augury” of what our fate may be, since life will often find a way of circumventing the considerations of our original prediction.
This is supported by the later lines, “If it be now, ‘tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now,” which emphasize the seemingly illogical or circular nature of events when viewed through a human lens of prediction or augury. When we view events in time, they may seem random or uncontrollable.
Why is this the case? Shakespeare suggests that we cannot know our fates: that it is perhaps something only a god can know. As Lisa Gim explains, the line “There is Special Providence in the fall of a sparrow” is a reference to Matthew x:29, where the scripture explains how even the death of a cheap sparrow is understood and controlled by God. The inclusion of this reference seems to be Shakespeare’s suggestion that understanding fate may take a higher power, that only God may understand why events truly happen.
What is interesting is how Hamlet responds to the idea that we may not control the future/our fates. Faced with the seeming reality of determinism by a higher or unknown power, Hamlet suggests that there is something we can do: be ready.
When Hamlet speaks of “readiness” in the excerpt, he argues that we should not attempt to avoid our fate (in Hamlet’s case, running away from his duel with Laertes). In Hamlet’s situation, he cannot know his fate is to fight Laertes. If God is in control of fate/determinism, humans/Hamlet cannot control or know what fate will entail. As a result, Hamlet’s readiness isn’t entirely logical. He cannot know what he should be ready for.
Yet, his argument in favor of readiness is reasons responsive: his conclusion stems from reasons that he has rationally considered for himself (the “augury” and “‘tis not to come” argument). Hence, following from Fischer and Ravizza’s reasons responsiveness model of a compatibilist solution to the freewill determinism debate, Hamlet’s logical conclusion of readiness constitutes an example of freewill, even if the world around him is deterministic. His reasons and rationality are his own, even if he cannot know or control what his true fate will be.
Herein lies the fun: in laying out an argument for accepting determinism and relinquishing freewill by choosing not to escape the duel, Hamlet’s argumentation in itself exemplifies a solution for the existence of freewill through Fischer and Ravizza's reasons responsiveness model of compatibilism.
Sources:
Hamlet: https://socrates.acadiau.ca/courses/engl/rcunningham/resources/Shpe/Hamlet.pdf#page=1.00&gsr=0
