Epistemic Ethics Before C. Thi Nguyen: Reading Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice

In knowledge exchanges between a “teacher” (providing information) and a “listener” (receiving information), we ordinarily place a sense of epistemic responsibility on the teacher. As someone who holds knowledge on a subject, they have a responsibility to convey that knowledge truthfully to their listener. If they fail to do so, they may be negligently misleading at best, or intentionally deceiving at worst.

In her article “Epistemic Injustice and A Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing,” Miranda Fricker suggests that the listener (or “hearer”) also has certain moral obligations in a testimonial exchange of knowledge. Unpacking how a hearer may come to trust a teacher’s testimony, Fricker suggests that hearers must develop a form of testimonial “sensibility,” governed by a virtue of “reflexive critical openness” to others.

Fricker’s main philosophical move is to introduce virtue ethics to capture the unreflective phenomenology of being a hearer. When we listen to others, we often take their word as true -  fully absent of reflection - unless ostensible “reasons for doubting” are introduced. This initial openness to others is what Fricker describes as a virtue of “reflexive critical openness,” since we are both open to unreflective listening, but also in a position of vigilance for signs of doubt.

From here, Fricker suggests that we may express different scales of reflexive critical openness when interacting with different people: distinct epistemic sensibilities for distinct individuals. In institutional structures, for example, we may be predisposed to greater openness when listening to our boss or a consultant. In contrast, we may be predisposed to less openness when listening to an office intern. Problems of epistemic injustice arise when our epistemic sensibilities for certain groups are unfairly predisposed, often due to culture, upbringing, or simple prejudice.

Interestingly, Fricker’s epistemic injustice can occur in two directions: 1) someone may receive less credibility than they deserve, or 2) someone may receive more credibility than they deserve. What I find most interesting is one of Fricker’s suggestions for how epistemic prejudice can be broken: through “critical reflection on the part of the hearer.” The example that Fricker gives is a teenager who may hold an epistemic prejudice against the elderly, but who reflects and changes his sensibilities after hearing a profound war story from his grandfather.

It’s hard to specify what conditions should entail critical reflection of one’s own epistemic sensibilities: without caution, these conditions themselves could become prejudiced. However, broadly, I feel that we could all benefit if we collectively lowered the bar for critical reflection of our own epistemic sensibilities. We could make critical reflection a more regular part of everyday conversations, especially when we feel most certain about whom to trust.

How could we practically encourage people to engage in further critical reflection of their epistemic sensibilities? K12 education is, perhaps, a good starting point. A K12 curriculum that emphasizes a greater range of perspectives and intentionally emphasizes ambiguity/non-objectivity in the humanities (this is often forgotten) can help us lower the bar for critical reflection.

Sources: 

https://www.mirandafricker.com/uploads/1/3/6/2/136236203/epistemic_injustice_and_a_role_for_virtue_in_the_politics_of_knowing.pdf 

Hamlet, Free will, Compatibilism, and Fischer & Ravizza's Reasons Responsiveness Model

In Act 5 Scene 2 of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a very interesting point about freewill is made when Hamlet responds to Horatio’s suggestion to avoid dueling Laertes. Responding to Horatio, Hamlet says,

“Not a whit. We defy augury. There is a 

Special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be

now, ‘tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be

now; if it be not now, yet it will come. The 

readiness is all. Since no man of aught he leaves

knows, what is ‘t to leave betimes? Let be.

In the above excerpt, Hamlet seems to accept our inability to control fate (I take this to be applicable to determinism, either secular or non-secular, though Shakespeare refers to fate determined by God). As Evan Robertson notes, “augury” refers to superstition or divination: human attempts to understand fate. When Hamlet writes “We defy augury,” he suggests that in our actual lived experiences “We” ultimately end up “defying” what we as humans try to predict for ourselves. Hamlet suggests it is folly to attempt to change our fate based on our prediction or “augury” of what our fate may be, since life will often find a way of circumventing the considerations of our original prediction.

This is supported by the later lines, “If it be now, ‘tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now,” which emphasize the seemingly illogical or circular nature of events when viewed through a human lens of prediction or augury. When we view events in time, they may seem random or uncontrollable.

Why is this the case? Shakespeare suggests that we cannot know our fates: that it is perhaps something only a god can know. As Lisa Gim explains, the line “There is Special Providence in the fall of a sparrow” is a reference to Matthew x:29, where the scripture explains how even the death of a cheap sparrow is understood and controlled by God. The inclusion of this reference seems to be Shakespeare’s suggestion that understanding fate may take a higher power, that only God may understand why events truly happen. 

What is interesting is how Hamlet responds to the idea that we may not control the future/our fates. Faced with the seeming reality of determinism by a higher or unknown power, Hamlet suggests that there is something we can do: be ready. 

When Hamlet speaks of “readiness” in the excerpt, he argues that we should not attempt to avoid our fate (in Hamlet’s case, running away from his duel with Laertes). In Hamlet’s situation, he cannot know his fate is to fight Laertes. If God is in control of fate/determinism, humans/Hamlet cannot control or know what fate will entail. As a result, Hamlet’s readiness isn’t entirely logical. He cannot know what he should be ready for.

Yet, his argument in favor of readiness is reasons responsive: his conclusion stems from reasons that he has rationally considered for himself (the “augury” and “‘tis not to come” argument). Here, we may introduce Fischer and Ravizza’s reasons responsiveness model of a compatibilist solution to the freewill determinism debate. Mapping their framework which frames acceptance of "reasons" as a condition for freewill, Hamlet’s logical conclusion of readiness constitutes an example of freewill, even if the world around him is deterministic. After all, his reasons and rationality are his own, even if he cannot know or control what his true fate will be.

Herein lies the curious conclusion! In laying out an argument for accepting determinism and relinquishing freewill, Hamlet’s argumentation in itself  exemplifies a solution for the existence of freewill through Fischer and Ravizza's reasons responsiveness model of compatibilism. 

Sources:

Hamlet: https://socrates.acadiau.ca/courses/engl/rcunningham/resources/Shpe/Hamlet.pdf#page=1.00&gsr=0

Lisa Gim: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1172&context=studies_eng_new 

Evan Robertson: https://obviousstate.com/blogs/journal/there-s-a-special-providence-in-the-fall-of-a-sparrow?srsltid=AfmBOop0qwE06XbIEz8gej_k5Vnqb9mnDEmOWw4LZzpQs-QMojiHhDyb 

Compatibilism: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#ReasRespComp

Bounded Rationality

In policy studies, rationality is often discussed in the context of the public. The question is whether the wider population can be considered as rational actors. Some scholars say this “rational choice” theory does indeed hold on a nationwide level. In this market based perspective of the public, individuals will always act in their best interest. For example, if there is a government grant available to small businesses in a certain region, under rational choice theory, all of those small businesses will theoretically apply for the grant on their own. Grants can thus be designed purely based on numbers, such as amount of money provided and number of slots available. Other scholars say that rational choice cannot be assumed within the public. They suggest that on aggregate, people’s values and beliefs play just as large of a role as perceived rational benefit. For example, a small business owner who is suspicious of government entities, perhaps due to previous problems with the IRS, may be unwilling to apply for government grants, even if they would benefit greatly from said grants. Here, the idea of rationality within the public lies at the center of one of the large debates in public policy, positivism vs post-positivism. Can we treat policy as a science, or do we have to surrender that individual values and beliefs prevent any sort of quantifiable policy solution. 

However, the people being affected by policy are only part of the story. In policy studies, rationality is also critical to understanding the actions of policy makers. The job of policy makers is characterized by the collection and understanding of information. Policy makers must collect information, both through data and personal/stakeholder accounts. Then, after understanding the meaning of this data, they must make decisions based on this information. Herein lies an issue: it's almost impossible for policy makers to know enough information to make the perfect decision. Issues often affect millions of people, each with their own life stories that will respond differently to a specific policy action. Yet, the polls and stakeholder accounts that policy makers have access to are often only a fraction of the total population. So, how can policy makers take decisive action when they cannot be sure of what they are doing? This is where bounded rationality comes into play. 

Bounded rationality is different from the traditional assumption of rational choice theory in one key aspect: it takes into account the limits of people’s knowledge and resources. First introduced by Herbert Simon, bounded rationality explains that it is unreasonable to assume that policy makers will always make the utility maximizing decision. This is because making the absolute utility maximizing decision would require the omnipotent knowledge of a god, something that policy makers trapped in the bureaucracy often do not have. So, unable to make perfectly fact based decisions, bounded rationality suggests that policy makers make choices based on feeling. Whether it is creating new educational programs in a low employment neighborhood or opening more soup kitchens during a financial crisis, policy makers will often lean on their “gut-feeling” rather than data. 

Through this, bounded rationality is significant because it provides a more realistic model of how policy makers make choices. It views policy makers more like humans and less like robots. After all, when an a large amount of information gets paired with tight timeframes, the analyst cannot expect the policy maker to make the perfectly rational decision. Bounded rationality provides the alternative, a perspective where the process of choosing policy is just as normative as the effects of policies themselves. Through bounded rationality, the policy process is not just dependent on the content of the policy, but also upon WHO the policy maker making the decisions is. Since policy making is almost always a cooperative effort, where heuristics intertwine between multiple individuals, things get even more complicated! This doesn’t mean that we should completely discard data based policy making, certainly not. But, it does raise questions about how we can incorporate heuristics measuring and other aspects of bounded rationality into policy analysis.